New Critique

A Guide to Dooyeweerd's New Critique of Theoretical Thought

An Exegesis of Dooyeweerd on Reformational Philosophy

Exegetical discussion of a paragraph from:

Herman Dooyeweerd, 1973: "Introduction by the Editor in Chief", Philosophia Reformata, 38.

The idea of a Christian Philosophy - Essays in Honour of D H Th Vollenhoven, (pp. 5-16), p.10f.

[Dooyeweerd is giving background to his working with his brother-in-law Vollenhoven. Having explained how Kuyper had begun to make a break with a scholastic understanding of humankind he proceeds to explain the basic orientation of his philosophy].

However, how was this reformational line to find adequate expression in philosophy? First of all it had to be clearly recognized that the rediscovery of the religious root-unity of human existence had to lead to a radical turn in philosophical anthropology and cosmology. The need for such a turn could only be demonstrated by way of an enquiry into the structure of the human horizon of thought and experience. This horizon appeared to be perspectival in character. That is to say that man's experiential world, as it discloses itself within cosmic time in its great variety of modal aspects, or fundamental modes of experience (which do not determine the concrete what, but only the how, the modus quo, of human experience and which express their mutual irreducibility, their indissoluble mutual coherence and their place within the cosmic order of time in their modal structure) is as it were radioscoped by the central religious sphere. In its turn the multi-modal dimension of the human horizon of experience throws light upon the inexhaustible diversity of individuality-structures in which things, events, and concrete societal relationships are realized within this horizon. It appeared that such realization could take place only within an extremely complex system of interlacements of the internal structural principle determining the proper irreducible character of one individual whole with the internal structural principles of individual things, events, or societal relationships of a different nature. Through such interlacements an individual whole acquires socalled enkaptic functions in individual wholes of a different nature, which functions do not fall within the typical lawsphere of its own internal structural principle. A matrimonial community, for instance, has an enkaptic civil function within the state.

[The discussion continues to explain how such a philosophy can serve to order Kuyper's conception of sphere-sovereignty which up until then had been somewhat haphazard in its scientific implications].

However, how was this reformational line to find adequate expression in philosophy?

Dooyeweerd collapses or weaves together various dimensions of his discussion thus far. Of first importance in this piece is his relationship with Vollenhoven who had been trained in terms of philosophy such as it existed at the VU in those decades. Since Dooyeweerd's "area" was law we might say that he hadn't been trained in philosophy as Vollenhoven had been. The word 'philosophy' in the sentence is of course not limited to what is taught in philosophy departments but it is implied in Dooyeweerd's discussion of the work that was needed if Kuyper's "reformational line' was to be followed. Philosophy is now implicitly included in the scope of the neo-Calvinistic appeal for Christian engagement in "all spheres of life". Would not philosophy that followed Kuyper, in so far as it took Kuyper's world-view seriously, result in an attempt to bring together the lines (scholastic and biblically reformational) that Dooyeweerd had begun to perceive were divergently at work in Kuyper's Wissenschaftslehre? Note that the question is not: "How then was philosophy to find adequate expression in this reformational line"?

First of all it had to be clearly recognized that the rediscovery of the religious root-unity of human existence had to lead to a radical turn in philosophical anthropology and cosmology.

There is a need for a sense of obligation, of mission, to be part of our spiritual perception. The statement is somewhat understated, in historical terms. Dooyeweerd is suggesting that if one is willing to view the Christian religion as set forth in Kuyper's Stone lectures - as part of an intellectual development that was initially given public form and impetus in the opening of the Vrije Universiteit - then one is forced to admit that its primary task is about restoration of the human condition in Christ Jesus and human existence is not only restored by a past act of God's Grace, but by an ongoing decree of God's providence, because He who now sits at God's right hand ensures the redeemed integrality of human existence at its root. Thus it is no use seeking an expression of this reformational line within philosophy if one does not accept that this rediscovery cannot but lead to a turn of radical consequences for the assumptions upon which philosophical anthropology and cosmology are to be based.

The need for such a turn could only be demonstrated by way of an enquiry into the structure of the human horizon of thought and experience.

To promote this turn within philosophy the case needs to be argued in terms of an enquiry into (the structure of �) thought and experience. This enquiry is what is needed within philosophy to begin the process of bringing this basic insight (about the religious root-unity of human existence) to some kind of coherent theoretical expression. It is not, in the first place, a theoretical analysis, so much as an enquiry into the structure of theoretical thought, by placing that thought fully within the expansive cadre of thought and experience. It is thus an enquiry "into the structure of the human horizon of thought and experience", within which and within which alone, philosophy not only comes to expression but makes sense. The need for such a turn can only come to light when, as a result of the enquiry, philosophy's necessary dependence upon a religious perspective is brought to light. The needful turn is not only for 'us' who perceive the radical implications of the 'religious root-unity of human experience' for philosophical reflection, but also for philosophy to find its rightful place and fulfill its peculiar calling.

This horizon appeared to be perspectival in character.

We are thus discussing how thought and experience (in relation to philosophy as well) are perceived, how thought and experience is intuitively understood to function in this world. This indicates an important reflexive and self-critical dimension implicit in Dooyeweerd's philosophy. This perspectival dimension may have come to light via (his close examination of Kuyper's world-view but at this point Dooyeweerd is doing two things: he is distinguishing his own 'perspective' from the necessarily perspectival horizon of thought and experience (ie refusing to meld them in his narrative and thus blur the need for self-critical awareness). He is thus also respecting the impact of world-views other than his own upon philosophy - the ages-long re-articulated 'perspective' of scholasticism as well as neo-Kantian humanism in which his own intellectual formation took place.

That is to say that man's experiential world, as it discloses itself within cosmic time in its great variety of modal aspects, or fundamental modes of experience (�) is as it were radioscoped by the central religious sphere.

This horizon is perspectival in so far as the full range of how things function is kept in focus, is held in tension, is surveyed from, what Dooyeweerd calls the central point of religious concentration - the central point that, as a point of religious concentration, is made possible because it is there that God speaks, that God the creator-redeemer does His work in us.

(which do not determine the concrete what, but only the how, the modus quo, of human experience and which express their mutual irreducibility, their indissoluble mutual coherence and their place within the cosmic order of time in their modal structure)

And it is because all thought and experience, things and events, have everything they are expressed within these modal aspects, that this structure of thought and experience, is itself now given provisional analytical description as the horizon within which philosophical thought (and all other kinds of thought) are to be found coming to expression. The distinction between how things function and what it is that exists is basic although this parenthesis is focused upon the how of experience, the mutual irreducibility of modal aspects, and their indissoluble mutual coherence among them and their place within the temporal cosmos. It might be asked why Dooyeweerd uses the phrase the "cosmic order of time" rather than "the temporal order of the cosmos" and it seems that this part of the sentence may be better stated as "and their respective places within the ordering or modal aspects within the temporal cosmic order."

In its turn the multi-modal dimension of the human horizon of experience throws light upon the inexhaustible diversity of individuality-structures in which things, events, and concrete societal relationships are realized within this horizon.

With insight into this perspectival horizon, which confronts every thinker, things, events, structures and relationships can be compared and contrasted, the world as we experience it can be investigated in an orderly way that takes into account the modal ordering of the human horizon of thought and experience. It is not only a light that is thrown on philosophical thinking although it is most certainly that - it gives hints for all kinds of new and creative reflection for human cultural and scientific and artistic activity. The theory of the modal aspects, however, is an attempt to articulate how this ordering of the multi-modal dimension of the human horizon of experience throws its light onto scientific and theoretical reflection and concept formulation. We have here Dooyeweerd's brief, albeit fundamental, summary of his philosophy the parenthetic aside is the account of the threefold cosmonomic idea which, is his own explanation of how philosophy is possible within the structure of human thought and experience. All philosophy he claims is included.

It appeared that such realization could take place only within an extremely complex system of interlacements of the internal structural principle determining the proper irreducible character of one individual whole with the internal structural principles of individual things, events, or societal relationships of a different nature.

This all too brief description of the basic approach of Dooyeweerd's philosophy takes a complex turn. Having identified how philosophy is oriented to the multi-modal dimension of the human horizon, it becomes clear that any such philosophic (pre-scientific) apprehension itself takes places as a human orientation, within a context that requires reflection but is not itself theoretical in nature. Philosophy, as one example, stands within "an extremely complex system of interlacements."

Should it read: "by which the internal strucrual principle of one individual whole, while determining its proper irreducible character is interlaced in extremely complex systems with internal structural principles of a different nature."?

Through such interlacements an individual whole acquires socalled enkaptic functions in individual wholes of a different nature, which functions do not fall within the typical lawsphere of its own internal structural principle.

There are indeed complex issues here - whole/part - that relate to traditional scholastic and humanistic ways of treating the analysis of "things, events and societal relationships."

A matrimonial community, for instance, has an enkaptic civil function within the state.

This is a formulation which also shows Dooyeweerd seeking to provide the children of neo-Calvinism with a view of marriage, family and the household that was distinct from the Roman Catholic (neo-scholastic) corporatist principle of subsidiarity, which was still very much a part of Kuyper's political program particularly in regard to householder suffrage, industrial law and the rights of women. here clearly, the neo-Calvinistic movement had accommodated the Roman catholic corporatist view of the matrimonial community. But what Dooyeweerd is at pains to point out is that even with such interlacements, which are found willy-nilly throughout creation, the distinctive integrity (sphere sovereignty) of various creatures (individuality structures) remains intact.

[And so the discussion continues with an explanation of how philosophy in its work can serve to order Kuyper's conception of sphere-sovereignty which up until then had not only been applied haphazardly but in ways by which the internal structural principles were lost to sight].

BCW Wednesday, June 22, 2005