New Critique

A Guide to Dooyeweerd's New Critique of Theoretical Thought

Chapter 1

Reading: Chapter I - The Pretended Autonomy of Philosophic Thought - I, (pp. 1 - 26).

Pretended Autonomy of Thought, pp. 1 - 4

Dooyeweerd opens with a statement regarding the problem of developing a Christian starting point for philosophy: the pretended autonomy of theoretical thought. By this he means that theoretical thought cannot be independent of religious presuppositions. The idea that thought can be religiously neutral has been elevated to a condition of philosophy.

This idea that thought can be autonomous faces a number of problems:

There is no common foundation; the presuppositions of Greek, Thomistic and modern secularised thought are different. There is no common basis for different philosophical trends.
Different philosophical trends usually end up arguing at cross-purposes. They are unable to find a way to penetrate their starting-points. This suggests that the starting points determine the meaning given to this autonomy of thought.

These problems suggest that there is a critical problem with the autonomy of thought.

Transcendental Criticism, pp. 4-6

Dooyeweerd then suggests the need to look at the nature of thought itself. Is this autonomy required by the inner nature of thought? To answer this question requires a transcendental criticism. This means we must examine it from a perspective that lies beyond the philosophical point of view.

Kant and Husserl both took the autonomy of theoretical thought as a self-evident truth.

Dooyewerd doesn’t demand that adherents of the autonomy of thought abandon it, rather he wants them to see it for what it is a dogma and to see them put it to a critique.

The theoretical attitude of thought displays an antithetical structure: the logical and non-logical aspects of thought are opposed.

Modal Aspects, pp. 6-9

Our experience has a great diversity of modal aspects. These modal aspects each have a modal kernel.

We can tabulate the modal aspects and there kernel as follows:

Modal Aspect:	Modal Kernel:	Special Sciences:
Numerical	Quantity	Arithmetic
Spatial	Continuous extension	Geometry
Movement	Motion	Mechanics
Energy (physico-chemical)	Energy and matter	Physics and Chemistry
Biotic	Life and vitality	Biology
Feeling and sensation	Feeling	Psychology
Logical	Distinction	Logic
Historical	Formative power	History
Symbolic signification	Symbolic representation	Languages
Social intercourse	Social intercourse	Sociology
Economic	Frugality	Economics
Aesthetic	Harmony	Art
Juridicial	What is due	Law
Moral	Love (self-giving)	Ethics
Faith or belief	Faith and vision	Theology

There has been much discussion over the names and terms used for the different modal aspects and modal kernels as well as their order; however, the main points remain. These are aspects of reality that cannot be reduced to each other.

These modal aspects relate to different special sciences; however, these special sciences don’t necessarily tell us about the inner nature and structure of the modal aspects. To understand these requires philosophical insight into the total coherence of the diverse aspects.

Analogical Moments, pp. 9-15

The modal kernels express themselves in what Dooyeweerd terms as analogical moments. These can be retrocipations or anticipations. Dooyeweerd looks at one example (the sensitive aspect):

	Modal Aspect:
Retrocipations:	Numerical
	Spatial	Sensation of spatiality
	Movement	Emotion
	Energy (physico-chemical)	Degrees of intensity
	Biotic	Feeling has its own mode of life
Kernel:	Feeling and sensation	Kernel: feeling
Anticipations:	Logical	Feeling for logical coherence
	Historical	Historico-cultural feeling
	Symbolic signification	Linguistic feeling
	Social intercourse	Social feeling
	Economic	Economic feeling
	Aesthetic	Aesthetic feeling
	Juridicial	Jural feeling
	Moral	Moral feeling
	Faith or belief

‘Was man nicht definieren kann, das sicht man als ein Fuhlen [Fühler] an’ translates as ‘What one cannot define, one sees as with a feeler’.

Subject and Object, pp. 15-17

A distinction is made between subject and object. Every thing has a leading function, or a qualifying aspect. In modes higher than its leading function (sometimes called its superstratum) it has an object function. For all aspects lower than its ‘leading function’ (sometimes called the substratum) it has a subject function.

For a tree, its leading function, or qualifying aspect, is biotic. Hence, for aspects lower than the biotic (i.e. numerical, spatial, kinematic and physical) it has a subject function, it functions ‘actively’: it has a size which can be measured, it takes up an amount of space, it sways in the breeze, it has certain physical properties, and it is a living thing. In the higher modes, it has an object function, it functions ‘passively’: it can have certain things done to it, but it of itself cannot do them. Its size, type and colour can be perceived, but it cannot perceive itself (sensitive); it cannot name itself but it can be named (lingual); it cannot think, but it can be thought about (analytical); it has a certain economic value but it cannot engage in economics (economic); it can be possessed but it cannot possess (juridical); and so on.

Hence, all things have either a subject or an object function in all modal aspects. Humans alone function actively as subjects in all modal aspects.

Naïve Experience, pp. 17-18

Naïve experience comes before all theories; it cannot be refuted by philosophical arguments. Dooyeweerd describes it as a pre-theoretical datum – it corresponds to the different modal aspects in their entirety. Any theory that cannot take these modal aspects into account will be flawed.

The True Starting Point, pp. 18- 20

Dooyeweerd then raises the important question: ‘What is the central reference-point in our consciousness from which this central theoretical synthesis can start?’ (p 19)

It must start outside theoretical thought, otherwise it is bound to the inter-modal synthesis between logical and non-logical thought. It must be transcendent (outside theoretical thought) rather than immanent (within theoretical thought). An immanent philosophy cannot escape the problem of making theoretical thought autonomous. It will inevitably absolutize one of the modal aspects.

Absolutization, pp. 20-

When a modal aspect is absolutized it leads to an –ism. Some –isms are shown in the table below. Absolutization elevates one aspect to become the totality of meaning so that it becomes an idol.

Modal Aspect:	Absolutizations:
Numerical
Spatial
Movement
Energy (physico-chemical)
Biotic	Biologism
Feeling and sensation	Sensualism Positivism
Logical	Logicism
Historical	Historicism
Symbolic signification	Wittgensteinism
Social intercourse	Kuhnianism
Economic	Economicism
Aesthetic
Juridicial
Moral
Faith or belief	Fideism

Kant’s Transcendental Method, pp. 21-

The remainder of the chapter examines Kant’s critical transcendental method and shows that Kant’s real starting point remains in the dark. Dooyeweerd’s radical critique seeks to uncover the starting point. Dooyeweerd’s critique goes further than Kant’s.

Immanuel Kant(1724 - 1804)

Kant attempted to mediate between rationalism and empiricism. His major works include A Critique of Pure Reason (1781), A Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and A Critique of Judgment (1993)

Exegesis of chapter 1, by Bruce Wearne:

The Pretended Autonomy of Philosophical Thought - 1

Dooyeweerd begins his discussion by addressing what appear to be various tendencies in Christian philosophizing that had arisen, or were likely to arise, among those who had lived through and experienced the cultural aftermath of World War II. It might seem that the two wars have brought about a situation where Christian philosophy is finally seen to be of utmost importance. But, says Dooyeweerd, a Christian approach to philosophy does not arise because of problems created by war, no matter how terrible or destructive that war may have been. To promote Christian philosophy in this context requires us to understand where philosophy has come from, where it is now and where it is going. The Christian critique of the autonomy-idea does not arise outside of philosophy's historical context. We must start within a historical context even if we do not start with our historical context as our basis.

Every philosophy which claims a Christian starting-point is confronted with the traditional dogma concerning the autonomy of philosophical thought, implying its independence of all religious presuppositions. It may be posited that this dogma is the only one that has survived the general decay of the earlier certitudes in philosophy. This decay was cased by the fundamental spiritual uprooting of Western thought since the two world wars.

[sentence one] If we are to engage in philosophy from a Christian standpoint, it's well to know where we are. Just where are we? First, we confront that dogma which, by and large, is identified with philosophy itself - that dogma that philosophy's distinctive integrity is guaranteed by itself, by what it does in our life, by its independence, by the fact that it is its own law. This is the basic law-idea of philosophy as we confront it today. [sentence two] We might then want to orient our thinking with the assertion that this dogma is the only thing about philosophy that is left standing. But we are in the midst of profound developments which have been and are being disclosed and the earlier certitudes of philosophy have seemingly melted away. [sentence three] We might also want to claim a Christian starting point for our philosophy over against the decay, and even proceed to do so by suggesting that the decay in philosophy is a symptom of the "fundamental spiritual uprooting" that is a consequence of two world wars.

Nevertheless, it is the very crisis in the earlier fundamentals of philosophical thought, which has paved the way for a radical criticism of the dogma of autonomy. Such a criticism is not only necessary from a Christian point of view, much rather it must be considered the primary condition of a truly critical reflection, irrespective of the difference in starting-point. For the acceptance of the autonomy of theoretical thought has been elevated to an intrinsic condition of true philosophy without its having been justified by a critical inquiry into the inner structure of the theoretical attitude of thought itself.

[paragraph two sentence one] Sure, philosophy has been undergoing some pretty tumultuous developments of late - in the last couple of centuries philosophy has experiences great development but we now confront its general decay such that it might appear that the only thing left is this (seemingly) timeless and immutable dogma. The spiritual uprooting of two world wars simply manifests itself in a process by which philosophy itself has been eroded to reveal its nakedness. [sentence two] This process within philosophy - the response to the crisis in earlier "philosophical fundamentals" - has paved the way even for philosophy which claims a Christian starting point. If we are to develop a philosophy on a Christian basis we should not proceed to a critique of the dogma of autonomy blind to the process that has brought us to this most fundamental critique. So we might want to say that what we are proposing is an alternative view, but our ability to present an alternative philosophical view still depends upon the aforementioned crisis and its unfolding. We might want to say that the result of this crisis leaves us with no choice by to proceed to a radical criticism of the dogma of autonomy, but let us keep in mind that such a radical criticism should be the characteristic of all philosophical thinking from whatever starting point it might arise. [sentence three] But it is the belief itself, the axiom which is supposedly self-evident, which is now cannot avoid being subjected to critical investigation. It is the crisis in confidence with this supposedly fundamental philosophical tenet that demands a critical enquiry into the inner structure, the distinctive integrity, of theoretical thought itself.

So long as the belief in human theoretical reason as the ultimate judge in matters of truth and falsehood was unchallenged, this belief could be accepted as a theoretical axiom. But it is this very belief, which, to a high degree, has been undermined in our day as a result of a radical historicism, the influence of depth-psychology, the so-called Lebensphilosophie and, at least in Europe, the powerful influence of Existentialism. This makes the assertion that autonomy is the primary condition of philosophical thought all the more problematic, insofar as it is maintained in the present situation of Western philosophy.

The sovereignty of philosophy within its own sphere was assumed to have been philosophically derived. This was the crisis point for reason and science which built itself upon this foundation. If scientific reason is the path by which meaning is found, what is the meaning of science? And so humanistic philosophy has turned to examine its own fundamental axioms and their emergence within human experience. The sovereignty of reason within its own sphere could be maintained only so long as its axiomatic character was left unexamined. But then its character as belief, rather than merely logical assumption, must come to the fore and various routes have been sought to explain how autonomy/rationality has come about as 1. a result of historical development (even as reason is considered to by the goal of history and the fundamental assumption of scientific historiography); 2. a reflex which emerges in normal human development as a result of a basic psychological need to make sense of experience derived from all the senses; 3. a survival mechanism implicit in the evolution of the universe; 4. a myth that still works even if it works against a basic and prevailing meaning-lessness. (It is notable that neo-Marxism that coincides with Dooyeweerd's diagnosis here, replaced its faith in the revolutionary proletariat with the transformative power of rationality to establish a human society).

At this point (p.2 "But apart from …" Dooyeweerd reverts to a discussion he had outlined in his previous post-war English publication - Transcendental Problems in Theoretical Thought in which the multi-vocal meaning of autonomy is itself referred to as a good reason to examine the dogma about reason's autonomy. The argument is that if the dogma of the presumed autonomy of theoretical thought is true why does it take on different dominant streams of western thought. An analysis of the dogma espoused by these traditions of philosophy shows that the dogma lacks a uni-vocal sense because of different presuppositional bases upon which philosophy is launched.

I wonder whether Dooyeweerd developed this initial introduction as an address to those keen to promote his philosophy. It seems to me quite likely.

Key Terms

Absolutization	One aspect becomes the totality of meaning; it makes an idol of that aspect.
Analogical moments	Retrocipations and anticipations.
Anticipation	An analogy within a modality that refers to a higher mode.
Antithetical	Having an opposition or a strong contrast or an exact opposite.
Autonomy	Derived from two Greek terms auto and nomos, it means without law; i.e. self-governing or guided by its own principles.
Autonomy of thought	The idea that thought is guided by its own principles.
Cosmic time
Modal aspects	The fifteen (or so) irreducible aspects of reality: numerical, spatial and so on. Dooyeweerd also calls them modal spheres, law spheres, modalities, modes or aspects.
Modal kernel
Modern secularised	Contemporary thought that doesn’t take God into consideration; at the time Dooyeweerd was writing this would have included positivism.
Naïve thought	This is pre-theoretical thought – everyday experience.
Presuppositions	What is taken for granted or presupposed.
Retrocipation	An analogy within a modality that relates to an earlier mode.
Supra-temporal	The supra-temporal means literally above the temporal; it includes the eternity of God. This is the realm of faith commitments.
Temporal horizon	This is created reality.
Theoretical thought	Any kind of abstract thought such as philosophy, theology or the sciences.
Transcendental critique
Thomistic thought	Thought associated with Thomas Aquinas.

Review Questions

What is meant by the autonomy of thought?
Why does Dooyeweerd call it the ‘pretended autonomy of thought’?
Why is the dogma of theoretical thought facing a critical problem?
What does Dooyeweerd mean by a qu[a]estio iuris?
Why does philosophy need a transcendental critique of theoretical thought?
How is the theoretical attitude of thought characterised?
What is meant by the temporal horizon of human experience?
Why was the fundamental difference between theoretical and non-theoretical thought entirely misinterpreted?
Identify the different analogies in the historical aspect.
Which modal aspect will have (a) no anticipations and (b) no retrocipations?
What is naïve realism? Why does Dooyeweerd reject it?
Why does Kant’s view of the transcendental ego land in ‘pure mythology’?

Study Questions

Does theology have to have philosophical presuppositions?
Choose a theological system and identify its philosophical presuppositions.
How does supra-theoretical, theoretical and pre-theoretical thought differ?
How does Dooyeweerd’s concept cosmic time relate to the supra-temporal and temporal time?
Identify the different modal aspects that occur in the chemical element oxygen.
Identify the –isms that absolutize the numerical, the spatial and the movement aspects of reality.
Compare and contrast Kant’s and Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique.

Take It Further

Clouser. 2005: The Myth of Religious Neutrality. Chapter 11 ("A Biblical Theory of Reality").
Strauss. 2000: 'The order of the modal aspects' in Contemporary Reflections on the Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd.
Wolff. 1978: A Key to Dooyeweerd. Chapters 1-13.
Kalsbeek. 1975: Contours of a Christian Philosophy. Chapters 8-9; 11-14 ("The meaning-character of temporal reality", "Irreducibility of the aspects", "The order of the modal aspects and their meaning-kernels", "Analogies", "Sphere Universality. Isms", "Antinomies and their origin").
Spier. 1966: An Introduction to Christian Philosophy. Chapter 2 ("The Theory of Cosmic Modalities or Law-Spheres").
The Dooyeweerd Pages: "The Aspectual Framework of Meaning"; "Dooyeweerd's Theory of Modal Aspects".
Glenn Friesen's glossary page on aspects.